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This paper concerns three significant aspects of twentieth century history in 
both Australia and Britain:  trade unions, railways and war. During the world wars 
trade unionists in both countries worked under poor conditions, and sometimes 
endured loss of hard-won privileges in order to further the war effort, and in the hope 
that governments and employers would acknowledge their sacrifices and redress their 
grievances once peace was restored.  The paper discusses two instances, one in 
Western Australia and one in Britain, where these grievances were not addressed after 
the War, and examines the different outcomes. After comparing the circumstances in 
which the Australian Standard Garratt and the WD ‘Austerity’ heavy freight 
locomotives were produced, it explores the problems with these engines and the 
outcomes arising from union grievances. Finally, the paper posits that studying the 
outcomes of these industrial disputes on the railways, arising out of wartime 
conditions, furthers our understanding of the stresses of war on society. 
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In October 2013, it will be 70 years since the first Australian Standard Garratt 
[henceforth ASG] engine entered service in Queensland.
3
  This year (2011) marks the 
sixtieth anniversary of the engine’s decommissioning in Western Australia, where it 
was designed; most others of this class had been consigned to a similar fate by the 
mid 1950s.
4
  Despite having probably the shortest career of any steam locomotive in 
Australia, the ASG has continued to spark debate in web forums among locomotive 
enthusiasts as recently as 2010
5
.  While the history of the ASG’s many technical 
failings is well known among Australian rail buffs
6
 and its industrial history has been 
recounted by labour historians,
7
 it is likely that an international readership may be 
unaware of the distinction between the ill-fated Australian Standard Garratt and its 
much better known and superior ‘relative’, the Beyer, Peacock-built (or Beyer-
Garratt) articulated locomotive, which was a popular and successful engine in many 
parts of the world, including Australia. How and why the ASG differed from the 
Beyer-Garratt will be discussed shortly.  
This paper concerns three significant aspects of twentieth century history in 
Australia and Britain:  trade unions, railways and war.  Unfortunately, many studies 
of the latter two have neglected the influence of the former,
8
 yet closer examination 
shows that during the world wars trade unionists in both countries worked under poor 
conditions, and sometimes sacrificed hard-won privileges in order to further the war 
effort, and in the hope that governments and employers would acknowledge their 
sacrifices and redress their grievances once peace was restored.  Exceptions among 
railway workers during World War I were the 1917 General Strike that began in the 
Sydney railway and tramway workshops and spread to Victoria and Queensland, and 
the British ‘ten-shilling’ strike of September 1918.
9
  In World War II, Australian 
 3 
unions suffered from the popular perception that they were uncooperative and spent 
much time on strike.  Popular Labor Prime Minister John Curtin was reportedly 
reduced to tears over his frustration at striking coal miners in 1942 and 1943.
10
  
The paper discusses two instances, one in Western Australia and one in 
England, where these grievances were not addressed after the War, and examines the 
different outcomes. Firstly, it compares the engines central to union complaints, the 
ASG and the similarly hastily produced WD ‘Austerity’ heavy freight locomotive, 
designed in Britain by Robert Riddles. Secondly, it explores the problems with the 
ASG, and examines the consequences for the Western Australian Government 
Railways [WAGR], the Western Australian Locomotive Engine Drivers’, Firemen’s 
and Cleaners’ Union [hereafter the WALEDF&CU or the Union] and the WA State 
Labor Government.
11
  The paper then compares these with industrial conflict at 
Bristol concerning Austerity engines in 1947, and suggests reasons for the very 
different outcomes of union grievances over these wartime engines. This comparison 
is justified not only because of the similar circumstances in which the locomotives 
were designed and created, but also because the unions involved – the WALEDF&CU 
in Western Australia and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and 
Firemen [ASLEF] in Britain were both footplate unions, with similar histories, career 
structures, working conditions and elite traditions which separated them from other 
railway workers.
12
  Finally, the paper posits that studying the outcomes of these 
industrial disputes on the railways, arising out of wartime conditions, furthers our 
understanding of the stresses of war on society. 
 
Freight requirements in wartime Australia 
 4 
During World War II, the State-run railways in Australia desperately needed modern 
locomotives capable of hauling heavy loads.  With funds and resources in short 
supply, Fred Mills, the Chief Mechanical Engineer [CME] at the WAGR’s Midland 
Workshops near Perth, adapted the design of an earlier Beyer-Garratt locomotive to 
create the Australian Standard Garratt for service on 3 foot 6 inch gauge railways in 
Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia and the Northern Territory.
13
  Even before 
the engine was off the drawing board, rail authorities in Queensland and Tasmania 
opposed the project. Sixty-five locomotives were constructed, with the first entering 
service in 1943.  The speed of the Garratt’s design and construction was regarded as 
‘an outstanding feat of draftsmanship, fabrication, assembly and logistics, all the more 
remarkable because it was done in wartime’.
14
 Similar praise was accorded R. A. 
Riddles’ 2-8-0 and 2-10-0 heavy freight engines, mass produced in wartime Britain, 
and known as ‘Austerity engines’ because of their ‘no frills’ design. Whereas Riddles’ 
engines were mainly successful, however, the Australian Standard Garratt turned out 
to be an expensive failure.  
Despite opposition from the Queensland and Tasmanian governments and 
demands for further modifications, the Garratt entered service in 1943-44.  Because of 
the movement of both American and Australian troops to Northern Queensland during 
the Pacific War, Queensland Government Railways [QGR] was under incredible 
pressure.  Whiting states that in early 1943, ‘14,000 tons of military traffic was … 
stranded in New South Wales because of the inability to trans-ship it to QGR’. The 
Army required a weekly minimum of sixty-three trains but was getting only forty.
15
 
The states were required to lease them from the Commonwealth Government, with 
option to purchase.  The WAGR bought twenty-five engines to help replenish their 
aging locomotive stock, 84 per cent of which was at least thirty years old, which was 
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regarded as being the end of an engine’s economic life. This circumstance had arisen 
because locomotive production at Midland ceased during the Depression and had not 
recovered sufficiently prior to the war.  Additionally, the WAGR had responded to an 
urgent request from the Federal Government in 1942 for twenty-six shunting engines 




The Beyer-Garratt and its Australian modifications 
H.W. Garratt designed the original, articulated engine in 1911. Because of its ability 
to work on light lines and negotiate tight bends while pulling heavy loads, the Garratt 
was used extensively on narrow gauge railways in Western Australia and Tasmania.  
The WAGR purchased twelve ‘M’ and ‘MS’ class engines from Beyer, Peacock and 
Company in Manchester, and the WAGR Workshops constructed ten new Garratt 
engines in 1929. Fred Mills (then the WAGR’s Chief Draftsman), modified the MS 
class design, and produced 74-ton ‘MSA’ class engines. Capable of hauling 302 tons 
over a grade of one in forty-five, they were the first locomotives manufactured 
entirely in Western Australia.
17
  There were no major problems with the MSA 
engines, a fact that was noted by the Royal Commissioner in his 1946 Report.
18
  The 
findings of this Report will be discussed in detail later in this paper.   
In 1942, the Commonwealth Land Transport Board appointed Jack Ellis, the 
WA Commissioner of Railways, to investigate the carrying capacity of all three-foot-
six-inch gauges in Western Australia and Queensland, where the impact of the Pacific 
war was greatest. Ellis recommended building light, medium and heavy models of 
locomotives on the Garratt principle. To reduce the Garratt’s rigid wheelbase from 13 
feet 6 inches to 9 feet to comply with Queensland restrictions, the leading coupled 
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wheels were made flangeless, giving the locomotive greater ease in riding around 
severe curves.
 19
  The flangeless wheels would cause derailments on the new engines.  
The Commonwealth Land Transport Board approached Beyer, Peacock, who 
offered two models, but the Board rejected both, and a subsequent offer of drawings 
only, as too expensive. Instead, the War Cabinet accepted the Board’s 
recommendation to design and build the locomotives in Australia. This decision was 
probably based on the success of Mills’ MSA engines, as well as expense. Using 
Beyer, Peacock’s earlier type 120328 drawing as a basis, Mills, now Chief 
Mechanical Engineer at the WAGR Workshops, designed and supervised construction 
of the ASG engine. Mills’ modifications created a larger firebox, boiler, coal bunker 
and water tanks, enabling the engine to travel long distances, but increased the overall 
weight by 9.5 Imperial tons (8.6 metric tonnes). This additional weight was decreased 
by reducing the thickness of plates used for frame stays, cutting holes in the sides of 
the boiler cradle frame and in main plates of engine frames, making some of the 
control rods hollow, and introducing other ‘economy features’, which arguably 
weakened the structure of the locomotive.
20
 
The Commonwealth Land Transport Board spread the manufacture of the 
components over 105 different shops, with four assembly points including Midland. 
The manufacturers did not build a prototype for rigorous testing before mass 
production; the first locomotive was built in four months and, as mentioned 
previously, entered service in Queensland in October 1943.
21
  By April 1944, after 
being in service only a few months, ten ASG engines were standing idle at the 
Rockhampton Workshops in Central Queensland, following the discovery of serious 
defects in their design.
22
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British ‘Austerity’ Engines 
Although the sixty-five Garratt engines were produced with what may have been 
unprecedented haste in Australia, Britain built 935 modified 2-8-0 heavy freight 
‘Austerity’ engines for wartime use in less than half the time it took to produce the 
ASG.  Larger ‘Austerities’ with a 2-10-0 wheel configuration began rolling out of the 
North British foundry in June 1944.  Like the ASG, the 2-10-0 was designed to haul 
heavy loads over ‘light, impoverished, or imperfect track’, and it had many 
modifications including flangeless centre coupled wheels to aid in negotiating tight 
curves.
 23
  In this characteristic as well as size, the 2-10-0 (or ‘WD’) compares more 
closely to the ASG, than other ‘Austerity’ models used in Britain.
24
  
Prior to this, American S160s (also called ‘Austerity engines’), had arrived in 
Britain at the end of 1942. British crews had not been trained to drive these imported 
engines, often working them in unfavourable conditions such as wartime blackout.  
After the firebox of an S160 collapsed at Thurston, Suffolk, in the early hours of 12 
January 1944, causing serious injuries to the driver and fireman, crews were ordered 
to maintain boiler pressure at or below 200 pounds, although the engines’ official 
rating was 225 pounds.
 25
  But, in his report to the Ministry of War Transport, the 
accident investigator, J. L. M. Moore, regarded the driver and fireman as being at 
fault for not checking the test cocks to ascertain the level of water in the boiler.
26
   
  The British-built engines also met with opposition, but not initially from the 
footplate staff.  Several railway managers opposed their introduction, with the Chief 
Engineer of the London, Midland & Scottish Railway refusing to run them on the 
company’s lines until they had been adequately tested to demonstrate their ability to 
negotiate sharp curves safely.  Arguably, the role of the railway managers of private 
companies under government control for the duration of the war has some parallels 
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with Australian state rail authorities in the same period.  Normally, there was no 
federal interference in the running of the Australian state railways, but the wartime 
National Security Regulations granted the Commonwealth government many new 
powers, including over transport. The British locomotives passed the tests 
satisfactorily and entered service.
27
  Even so, the engines were quite rough to operate, 
which may have caused safety issues, and they were restricted to a maximum speed of 




Problems with the ASG 
ASG enginemen found difficulty travelling at even half the engine’s maximum speed 
of 45 miles (72 kilometres) per hour.  By July 1944, three State government railway 
departments were complaining about the ASG’s structural weaknesses and numerous 
mechanical failings.  Despite Queensland’s hostility to the engines, and Tasmania’s 
refusal to accept any more until modifications were made, however, WAGR’s Chief 
Transport Officer declared that the locomotives were satisfactory. The State 
Government purchased twenty-five engines at a unit price of £12,000, which Mills 
and Evans, the Chief Traffic Manager of WAGR, thought was a bargain.
29
 
[Fig 1 Here– first Garratt produced in WA outside the shed at Midland] 
Early complaints from footplate staff concerned the engine passing through 
the Swan View Tunnel in the hills outside of Perth. Built in the shape of a Gothic arch 
in 1895-96 for smaller engines, the tunnel measured over 1,000 feet in length, with a 
maximum height of fourteen-foot-two-inches and a width of only twelve-foot-six-
inches. The ASG had a clearance of less than two feet at the highest part of the tunnel 
and six inches at the sides.  In 1942, Thomas Beer was asphyxiated in the tunnel, 
while driving a smaller engine than the Garratt, and the three other crew members on 
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the double-headed train lost consciousness.
30
  The WALEDF&CU staged a stoppage 
in February 1944, resulting in the Commissioner of Railways agreeing that ASGs 




 On the night of 12 September 1944, fireman Frank Whitmore, working 
locomotive ASG29 on a suburban line between Perth and the port of Fremantle, died 
after being struck by an object on a passing train.  The shocked driver, Robert 
Stafford, continued in his journey with only the guard’s assistance and derailed his 
engine on the bridge over the Claremont subway, further along the line.
32 
 The inquest 
into Whitmore’s death heard that the ASG’s extra width might make the crew 
vulnerable to being struck by an open carriage door of a passing train, if they were 
leaning out of the cab.  The Coroner ruled that Whitmore’s death was caused by a 
fractured skull and ‘laceration and disorganisation’ of the brain, after being struck – 
possibly by the open carriage door of the passing passenger train.
33
   
Fig. 2. Claremont subway crash 
 
The Union’s response 
Union Secretary Harry Webb insisted that the width of the ASG cabin constituted a 
safety hazard. In a similar accident, a carriage door struck a cleaner – fortunately 
without fatal consequences – and other mishaps included a potentially fatal derailment 
near Bridgetown in April 1945, but the enginemen continued working ASGs until the 
end of the war. When the Union again demanded that the engines be withdrawn from 
service and undergo modifications, William Marshall, the Minister for Railways, 
mentioned the ‘colossal’ sum of money spent on purchasing the ASG locomotives, 
and the loss of haulage power if they were taken off the road (‘which would provide 
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an opportunity for road competition to become firmly established’).  A Union 
ultimatum that members would not to take any Garratt engines on traffic after 
12.01am on 11 October 1945, sparked activity in the Premier’s Department.  By 1945, 
the ALP had held government in Western Australia since 1924, with the exception of 
one term in the worst years of the Depression (1930-33).  Always moderate 
politically, the party in Western Australia was strongly influenced by its largest 
affiliated union, the Australian Workers Union.  Prior to 1963, the ALP served as both 
the workers’ political party and their industrial representatives, there being no 
separate Trades and Labor Council in Western Australia, such as existed in all of the 
other Australian states.  Unions were affiliated to the ALP and elected representatives 
to District Councils who in turn sent delegates to the State Executive and the triennial 
State Conference. Consequently, if a union disaffiliated from the ALP because of a 
disagreement, it had no representation in the Councils of the Party, although it was 
still a registered union in the Arbitration Court.
34
   
On 8 October, Premier Frank Wise called the Union’s bluff. Although he 
allowed some concessions, such as giving priority to repairing other types of engines 
and running ASGs on single lines to avoid a repeat of the accident that caused 
Whitmore’s death, Wise insisted on keeping them in service, but 
 
he agreed to appoint 
a Royal Commission to investigate their structural and mechanical efficiency and 
their operation and safe-working.
 35
   
Railways Department officials, however, scoffed at the Union’s concerns. The 
Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Tomlinson, said the Union’s objection was based ‘only 
on the safety factor’ – as if this was an insignificant issue – and claimed that 
‘excessive speed’ (or driver error) caused the Bridgetown derailment.  Tomlinson 
asserted that the ASGs had ‘only one case of derailment in 330,000 miles of running 
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… less than half the rate of normal derailments’; there was ‘no substance’ in the 
Union claim that they were dangerous. ASGs represented seventeen per cent of the 
available WAGR goods engine stock and were hauling twenty-five per cent of the 
goods load, ‘proving that they are above average efficiency’. The Department was 
prepared to test any ASG locomotive on any section of line where they were 
authorised to run, under conditions determined by the Union, and would abide by the 
result of the test.
36
  This was a very different reaction from that of QGR, which had 
complied with the ban that the AFULE placed on the engines after they started 
derailing.  By 1945, twenty ASGs were lying idle in Queensland sidings.
37
  According 
to Whiting, the greatest opposition to ASGs came from the Commissioner, P.R.T. 
Wills, who opposed the Commonwealth Land Transport Board’s decision to construct 
them instead of the C17, a Queensland-built engine which, Wills believed, was more 
suited to that State’s railway system.  Whiting attributes this hostility at least partly to 
a conservative culture that had seen little technological innovation in several decades.  
Unlike Western Australia, QR did not have a history of using Beyer-Garratt 
locomotives, having resisted previous attempts to import them from Britain, despite 
the fact that they were ideally suited to Queensland’s light, narrow-rail lines, and 
proved to be so when introduced after the war.
 38
  
On 10 October, in Western Australia, Premier Wise announced the 
appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate all aspects of the dispute between 
the Commissioner of Railways and the Union, to determine whether the locomotives 
were safe, economical and satisfactory, and if not, to advise what modifications were 
practicable.
 39
  Pending the Royal Commission’s outcome, Wise asked the Railways 
Department to come to an immediate agreement with the Union on removing ASGs 
from passenger services; restricting their speed to twenty-five miles per hour, and 
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eliminating all bunker-first running.  ASGs in the Workshops for repairs should be 
examined for defects mentioned by the Union.
40
  
The Union feared that the Railways Department would not honour the 
agreement, as evidenced by the fact that engine ASG30, which the Union claimed 
required major repairs and should be placed on low priority, was being repaired in the 
Workshops.  Nor had the Department complied with the request to run ASGs only on 
single lines. Webb warned that if the Department continued to ignore these 
conditions, the Union would again instruct its members to stop working the 
locomotives.
41
 On 22 October, Webb threatened to declare ASG30 black if it was 
repaired and put back into service, and he asked for work on it to cease. 
Commissioner Ellis appeared to comply and tensions eased briefly. 
42
  
 By the end of 1945, however, Union and Departmental differences seemed 
irreconcilable. Ellis complained to Marshall of the ‘irrationality’ of seven ‘modern, 
powerful engines standing idle’ when the State’s resources were so stretched.  As the 
results of the Royal Commission would not be known for months, he ‘strongly’ 
recommended that the Government urge the Union to agree to repairs being made.
43
  
Yet even when the Union accepted compromise, the Department continued to be 
obstructive, for example, refusing to provide free pairs of goggles for crews working 
engines bunker first – which would have facilitated lifting the embargo – because they 
estimated that it would be necessary to provide at least eighty-two pairs.  Soon, they 
argued, all crews would want goggles, and the expense could not be borne.
44
  
Considering the potential loss of freight revenues if the ASGs ceased operating, it was 
a false economy, but it indicates the extent to which WAGR Departmental policy was 
determined by financial constraints and short-term thinking. 
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The Royal Commission into the Australian Standard Garratt engine 
The Royal Commission began on Monday 5 November 1945, in an atmosphere of 
mutual hostility. The WALEDF&CU President, Alexander Davies, outlined his 
members’ complaints against the engine. Although ASGs pulled 20 per cent more 
than next strongest type of engine, they had to make more steam; the fireman was 
continually shovelling when going up a heavy grade; they were unsuited for shunting, 
because the excessive escape of steam seriously hindered visibility, especially in 
winter; they tended to derail, and their width made it dangerous when drivers and 
firemen had to lean out of the cab, as demonstrated by Whitmore’s death in 1944.
45
  
 P.C. Raynor, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Railways, disagreed with 
Davies about the Garratt’s capacity to derail. Davies asserted that there was evidence 
of many derailments in Queensland.
 46
  He denied that union objections were based on 
a fear of job losses. Indeed, the Union advocated the use of more powerful engines 
and a broader gauge railway.
47
  Certainly, there is no evidence of the Union making 
sustained criticism of any other engine on the WAGR system, and this also applied to 
the AFULE in the Eastern States, who, like ASLEF crews, adapted to imported 
American engines with little complaint.  Railway staff involved in preparing and 
driving the engines testified that ASGs had excessive oil consumption, problems with 
wheel bearings running hot and more need of mechanical attention than any other 
engine; they had been involved in shunting mishaps because of faulty steam brakes, 
and they tore up track.
48
  
 The divergence in points of view put by the Union and railway officials was 
starkly evident when Royston Macaulay Evans, the Chief Traffic Manager, gave 
evidence.  Evans asserted that the ASG was ‘in every way a safe, economical and 




  Mills reiterated that the engines were ‘completely safe’.  
Although they had been ‘completed hastily with little skilled assistance’, they were 
‘regarded as a proud achievement’.  He declared that safety had never been 
overlooked, nor ignored.  WAGR had ‘an unsurpassed record for safety’, with no 




 After the Royal Commission finished hearing evidence, several ASG and 
other types of engines underwent rigorous tests. Justice Wolf and Alex Davies were 
accompanied by three testing officers and a Commonwealth government 
representative. Experienced drivers and firemen were chosen to drive the engines.  
Between January and June 1946, twenty-one trials involved four ASGs and six other 
types of freight engines over country and metropolitan routes.  Overall, the other 
engines outperformed the ASGs, although several times the testers complained that 
the engines were poorly prepared for the tests, which Davies strongly denied.
51
  
After taking evidence in the Eastern States, Justice Wolf released his report on 
3 September 1946.  He concluded that the WAGR should not have purchased so many 
locomotives of ‘experimental design’, especially as the Commonwealth Land 
Transport Board knew of their many defects by mid 1944.  But, while the purchase 
was ‘an error of judgment’, it was ‘unthinkable’ that such expensive locomotives 
should be ‘thrown on the scrap heap’ if they could be made ‘roadworthy’. While QR 
decided to scrap their locomotives,
52
 Justice Wolf recommended that the WAGR 
adopt the same determination as Tasmania’s CME ‘to make the best of an 
unsatisfactory position’.  He asserted that the locomotives could be made safe for 
traffic and more efficient in operation, despite finding that they had ‘certain features 
which render [their] operation in some degree dangerous’.
53
  Wolf recommended 
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making thirty-six modifications, including fitting flanges to correct the controversial 
un-flanged design of the leading and intermediate wheels.
54
  
By the end of 1946, WAGR locomotives and rolling stock were in a dire state. 
Years of neglect occasioned by penurious and short-sighted government policy had 
been exacerbated by wartime demands.  The WAGR faced the prospect of spending 
£137,000 to correct the defects in their twenty-five Garratts, with additional costs of 
altering buildings in some depots.  This begs the question of why it would not have 
made more financial sense to purchase new locomotives. The Queensland 
Government, meanwhile, was expending £450,000 on ten new British-built Beyer- 





‘No Garratts – no surrender’  
The Triennial Delegates’ Conference of the WALEDF&CU on 21 October 1946 
asked the government to withdraw the ASGs from service.  A week later, the Union 
announced that its members would refuse to operate any ASG locomotives from 
midnight on 4 November.  At a compulsory conference in the Arbitration Court on 1 
November, Justice Dunphy threatened the union with deregistration if it took strike 
action.
56
  Deregistration would remove the union’s status as the legal representative of 
its members and open the way for a rival union, the WA Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Employees, to ‘poach’ members.
57
  The ALP’s State Disputes Committee 
also put pressure on the union, but the ban went into effect.  When the Commissioner 
suspended six members for refusing to work ASGs, the Union went on strike from 
midnight on Wednesday 6 November.
58
 Although a handful of unions supported 
them, the WALEDF&CU received little sympathy from most of the labour 
 16 
movement. Premier Wise stated in Parliament that some of the union’s leaders were 
‘allied directly with Communism’.
59
  This was a splendid irony, considering that 
several Union leaders had represented the ALP in Parliament, including Wise’s 
immediate predecessor as Premier.
60
  But, as Australia became embroiled in the Cold 
War politics that were enveloping the rest of world, the ALP entered an internecine 
conflict that would culminate in a party split. A vocal minority of unions, including 
the WALEDF&CU, were frustrated by the absence in Western Australia of an 
independent, non-partisan Trades and Labor Council [TLC].  It was not until 1963 
that a politically independent TLC formed in Western Australia, partly as a result of a 
curious alliance between Communist union officials and those who were members of 
the Right-Wing Democratic Labour Party that formed after the ALP split in 1955.
61
   
The strike not only represented a wider conflict between moderates and 
militants within the political and industrial branches of the Western Australian labour 
movement after World War II;
62
 its economic impacts were significant: an estimated 
90,000 people were thrown out of work, and power cuts had ramifications for industry 
and commerce.
63
  In the Arbitration Court on 12 November, Justice Dunphy began 
deregistration proceedings against the Union for instigating an illegal strike.
64
  
Deregistration increased the Union’s hostility towards the Arbitration Court, the State 
ALP and its Disputes Committee. The Union’s General Committee resolved on 13 
November not to resume negotiations unless the ASGs remained out of service and 
the suspended men were reinstated.  The Union lost its appeal to the Supreme Court 
against deregistration, which took effect from 18 November. The government offered 
to appoint an independent engineer within ten days, establish ‘an independent, 
adjudicating authority acceptable to the union’ to determine the basis and conditions 
under which ASGs would operate, and withdraw all penalties from the suspended 
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men if the Unionists would return to work.
65
  But the Union remained adamant that it 
would be ‘the final arbiter as to whether or not the ASG engines would run’.
 66
  
Attempts by the Premier to influence the union rank and file made the situation even 
worse, with the Union closing ranks, and its Midland branch demanding that either 
the Cabinet resign or the government hold an election.  ‘No Garratts – no surrender’ 
was their blunt message.
67
  On 21 November, the full bench of the Arbitration Court 
fined the Union £100 and each member of the Executive £10 for ‘initiating an 
unjustifiable strike’.
68
   
Yet the dispute ended surprisingly quickly.  The Collie Miners Union, whose 
membership was affected by the strike because much of the WAGR’s coal came from 
the mines at Collie, arranged for Stipendiary Magistrate W.J. Wallwork, an 
independent and highly respected negotiator, to act as mediator for the 
WALEDF&CU.  The government accepted Wallwork’s recommendation to appoint a 
five-member Industrial Board, comprising two union representatives, two technical 
representatives and a non-technical independent chairperson, to decide the minimum 
modifications necessary for each ASG before it was returned to traffic, and to oversee 
implementation of all of the Royal Commissioner’s recommendations.  The 
government also agreed to cease legal proceedings against the Union and support its 
application for re-registration in the Arbitration Court.  Settlement was reached on 22 
November, and the Union re-registered.
69
  No ASG was returned to traffic until the 
Midland Workshops had carried out modifications on all twenty-five, which were 
completed on 7 August 1948.  
 
Problems with Austerity ‘WD’ engines. 
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Meanwhile, in Britain in December 1947 some Bristol branches of ASLEF threatened 
to strike over the issue of safety on wartime locomotives.  Like the WALEDF&CU, 
ASLEF had eschewed direct action during the war, despite not gaining adequate 
remuneration in a time of prosperity for railway companies. Both ASLEF historians, 
McKillop and Griffiths, commented on the Railway Staff National Tribunal granting 
a pathetic one-shilling a week pay rise in 1942 – deemed ‘insulting’ by ASLEF 
Secretary Bill Allen, when the railways were making revenue in excess of one 
hundred per cent of their pre-war earnings.  But, while McKillop asserted that ‘the 
war effort had its narrowest escape from disruption’ over the issue, Griffiths stated 
that ‘a national strike was unthinkable at this juncture’ as ‘no industry more visibly 
epitomised the mobilisation for war’.
70
  Although lacking serious design defects, 
problems footplate staff experienced with WD engines
71
 included the glass breaking 
on water gauges, resulting in some cases of eye injuries; the driver’s view being 
obscured by equipment or excessive steam; inadequate weather protection, and 
difficulties with fire door handles, sanding apparatus and vacuum brakes. Initially, 
there were problems with the firebox design of 2-8-0 models, which resulted in the 
drop gate mechanism in the ash pan warping and burning after a build up of ash and 
clinker. Cracks and failure of the copper firebox tubeplates became common after the 
war.
72
  The executives of the private railway companies had either dismissed union 
requests for modifications as ‘impractical’ or blamed staff for being ‘unfamiliar’ with 
the engine, rather than accepting that there was any defect in the design.
 73
  Yet 
several months earlier, the Rail Executive had countermanded an order to overhaul 
the twenty-three remaining heavy freight ‘Austerity’ engines in Britain, the others 
having been sold overseas.
74
  This suggests that they regarded the engines as being 
not worth the expense of repair.  
 19 
At a meeting on 14 December, 1947, Bristol No 1 Branch of Great Western 
Railways footplate staff decided unanimously to refuse to operate Austerity engines 
after 31 December, as they were tired of receiving ‘platitudes and promises’ from 
ASLEF’s head office.  Members felt that the long-awaited nationalisation of the 
railways had not changed their circumstances, they were still dealing with same 
Ministry of Transport, and they were bitterly disappointed. ASLEF Bristol No. 1 
branch’s position was the opposite of the Western Australian union’s.  It argued that 
the government could deploy resources spent building new engines, more profitably 
in reconditioning ‘a score or so of Austerities’. In its December 1947 circular, the 
Branch demanded:   
Are we a Trade Union or a political party?  Are we paying contributions to 
make nationalisation a success at the expense of serious injuries and loss of 
careers to our Members?  The Ministry of Transport made no progress in six 
months… If an accident should occur, who suffers mental and perhaps 
physical pain: Head Office, The Ministry of Transport, the CME, or the 
Labour Government?  Neither [sic]. The men who keep saying these engines 
are not safe.  They are the men who will face the Ministry of Transport 
Inspector, to be criticised and possibly censored for some technical error …. 
Give us the engines, we will do credit to the trade union and contribute our 
part to the success of the Labour Government.  Ask the Driver who has had 
the gauge glass break on the road.  Ask the fireman who has had a blow on the 
head with the regulator.  Try yourself, to take a fire-iron out of the rack.  Get 
on the footplate and see what visibility you get …[T]ake two suits of clothing, 





Despite this aggressive circular, expressing similar frustrations to those 
experienced by the ASG footplate staff, no industrial action eventuated.  Neither of 
the histories of ASLEF mentions an industrial dispute over the Austerity engines, 
while Rowledge makes only a very brief reference to the GWR footplate staff forcing 
the matter of their grievances ‘to the highest level through the “Machinery of 
Negotiation”’ but does not state what the outcome was.
76
  Of the records sighted by 
the author, apart from Bristol, only Carmarthen branch referred to the complaint; their 
Minutes of November and December 1947 and January 1948 mentioned receiving 
circulars from Bristol No. 1 Branch concerning Austerity engines. The 
correspondence was noted and ‘commented upon’, but no further action appears to 
have been taken.
77
  This may have been because Carmarthen footplate staff did not 
work these engines, as appears to be indicated in Rowledge’s location figures.
78
  In 
the absence of any records from Bristol branch and the apparent silence of the 
Union’s central executive, or the press, on the matter, one is drawn to conclude that 
no dispute eventuated.  All of the WD engines were withdrawn from service in Britain 
by the end of 1962.
79
 
In Western Australia, the Garratts were permanently withdrawn from service 
in 1951, a decision perhaps made easier by Fred Mills’ early death, at the age of fifty-
one years, on 22 June 1949, after an illness attributed to the strain of the 1946 Garratt 
Royal Commission and two subsequent Royal Commissions into WAGR in 1947.
80
  
No blame had been laid upon Mills but he must have taken some responsibility for the 
engine’s many problems. 
 
Outcomes – a comparison between Western Australia, Queensland and Britain 
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Why were the WA government and the WAGR so insistent that ASGs should remain 
in service when QR had heeded the complaints of the AFULE? The Commissioner’s 
hostility towards the Commonwealth Land Transport Board undoubtedly helped and 
Wills felt vindicated in his earlier objection to the locomotives.  Conversely, the 
Western Australian CME, Mills, had designed the engine.  Arguably, the WAGR, and 
in particular CME Mills, had a vested interest in declaring the ASG safe.  Mills’ 
reputation as an engineer rested on his ability to refute accusations of poor design and 
construction. Furthermore, during and after World War II, the WAGR was in difficult 
financial circumstances, exacerbated by the increased demands of wartime, and were 
unable to meet production targets for engines and rolling stock.  But neither of these 
reasons was reflected in the reaction of Commissioner J.A. Ellis, who, in reporting to 
his Minister, rebutted Justice Wolf’s criticism of the Railways administration. Ellis 
claimed that safety was ‘hardly an issue’ until just before the Royal Commission was 
appointed; although he admitted that the Union had raised safety issues regarding 
Fireman Whitmore’s death, and the Swan View Tunnel.
81
   
Despite Ellis’ defence, the most damning evidence against the ASG’s 
roadworthiness appeared in his own figures, which showed that while constituting 
only 6 per cent of WAGR’s locomotive stock, Garratts had been involved in over 10 
per cent of main line derailments, almost 11 per cent of yard derailments and 13.5 per 
cent of all other accidents in the previous three years.  More than 50 per cent of 
WAGR’s locomotives were over forty years old;
82
 the Garratts were the newest 
engines in service. Yet, despite this evidence and the finding that Garratts performed 
poorly compared with similar heavy locomotives used in the Royal Commission 
trials, WAGR officials continued to re-iterate that these engines were ‘safe’, 
‘productive’ and a good bargain. Further evidence that cost was a significant factor in 
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Railways Department decision-making is in Ellis’ observation that the Royal 
Commission’s conservative costing of £5,500 per engine for modification, compared 
favourably with the ‘Sudan’ locomotives being imported from Britain at £14,000 
each, with half the ASG’s tractive effort.  
 Although the WALEDF&CU had not had a lot of support among other unions 
when it went on strike, in the minds of many unionists the outcome of the Union’s 
deregistration clearly demonstrated an unpalatable truth that they had suspected and 
accused the Arbitration Court of over several years: it was not always the neutral 
arbitrator between employer and employee.  By the 1940s, the WALEDF&CU was 
the largest of several dissident unions, with grievances dating from conditions 
imposed during wartime, which were not rectified with the coming of peace.
83
  
Several unions and the ALP’s Fremantle District Council called upon the ALP State 
Executive to demand that the Federal Government, led by former engine driver Ben 
Chifley, immediately institute long over due wage rises, end wartime rationing of 
clothing and foodstuffs, and raise the tax free threshold.  The State Executive refused, 
claiming that the necessary steps had already been taken to raise the Basic Wage, and 
that redressing the other grievances was on the Federal Government’s agenda.  
The unions took their revenge upon the Wise Labor government, which lost 
the March 1947 State election, sending Labor into Opposition for the first time in over 
a decade.  The party had been confident of winning the election and defeat was 
completely unexpected.  ALP State Secretary Tom Davies clearly saw union 
grievances, including the ASG dispute, as a contributing factor in the government’s 
defeat.  He wrote that, ‘the election campaign was handicapped from the start by lack 
of support and finance’ from the unions – out of a total of £820 in union donations 
almost half came from the Australian Workers Union – and ‘many thousands of 
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workers, including government employees, had voted against ALP candidates’.
84
  
Reporting to the ALP State Executive, Davies also alluded to the strike by stating that 
the party ‘could not pay lip service to arbitration, using it on some occasions’ and at 
other times resorting to strike action.
85
  Although other factors contributed to the 
government’s fall, the electoral defeat provided a salutary lesson to the ALP of just 
how much it depended upon its union base for funds and for votes. The swift demise 
of the ASGs, despite their expensive modifications, indicates a further victory and 
vindication for the Union.  Others have gone further in suggesting that the opposition 
to the ASGs in both Western Australia and Queensland set back Commonwealth 
Government attempts to introduce a standard railway gauge in all states,
86
 but it is 
noting that in 1944, when the inefficiency of the nation’s rail system and its 
incapacity to meet wartime demands was most evident, the Australian electorate had 
rejected a proposal to grant the Commonwealth a number of powers including ‘to 
make laws with respect to the uniformity of railway gauges’.
87
 
In contrast, in the Bristol dispute, the ASLEF Central Executive appears to 
have wanted to avoid embarrassing the newly-elected Labour Government while it 
was passing the Transport Act that would introduce permanent government ownership 
of Britain’s public transport system.  Certainly Clement Atlee’s Labour Government 
wished to avoid being side-tracked by industrial disputes. But unionists were 
mistaken if they thought that a state-owned system under a Labour government would 
be markedly different from the privately-owned railways. Nationalisation, according 
to Strangleman, ‘represented a change of legal ownership but was marked by 
continuity in organizational and managerial structures, and this had important 
implications for both workers and managers in the industry…’
 88
 Griffiths noted the 
appointment of Sir Eustace Missenden, former general manager of the Southern 
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Railway, as chair of the Railway Executive, and the lack of union representation on 
the British Transport Commission, which renewed tensions between ASLEF and its 
rival, the National Union of Railwaymen, as they competed for representation on the 
various sectional councils .
89
 Thus the union had little time to devote to internal strife, 
and the dissident ASLEF members found themselves without the support of either the 
Labour Government or their own union.  Indeed, the debate regarding the future of 
industrial action that might have been had in 1947 was in fact held the following year 
in the pages of the Locomotive Journal in the form of the question, ‘How far and how 
fast should the union go in fighting for its national programme now that the industry 
is in public ownership?’
90
  The two sides of the argument were represented by 
militants such as E.W. Jackson, who sneered bitterly that unionists were expected 
now to be ‘very good boys and work very hard to make the railways pay their way 
before we can ever hope to reach that Utopian dream [which] is fading away like the 
“Cheshire Cat”, leaving the grin behind as if to remind us that we have been 
completely fooled,’ and moderates such as Norman McKillop, who chided the 
militants for their ‘immaturity’.
91
  Much wider union support for an ‘unofficial’ 
dispute that broke out in the northern English depots in 1949, in which one hundred 
crew members refused to operate a new timetable which would necessitate extra 
lodging turns
92
 suggests that the militant view was gaining precedence, and that the 
patience which members had awaited the changes they believed would come with 
peace and nationalisation was exhausted.  
In summary, the wartime circumstances in the which the ASGs and the 
‘Austerities’ were constructed were quite similar, and although the outcomes were 
very different, it is suggested that these two cases illustrate the frustrations suffered 
by unionists during wartime, on the one hand trying to contribute to victory and on 
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the other fighting to avoid unnecessary loss of wages and conditions – and in these 
cases, trying to maintain adequate safety standards despite pressure to cope with 
inferior or unfamiliar equipment . These cases assist our understanding of the 
pressures that workers, and their union executives, experienced during wartime – such 
as working in blackout conditions, working longer shifts and foregoing pay rises.  
These pressures were not immediately alleviated with the coming of peace because of 
political and economic circumstances in which governments often found themselves 
after the cessation of hostilities. 
Finally, what of the engines at the centre of these disputes?  In Britain, despite 
some objections to Austerity engines expressed initially by rail management and later 
by some footplate staff, the dispute was brief, localised and disappeared with barely a 
trace.  While, like the ASG, Austerity engines were replaced from the early 1950s in 
both Europe and Britain, it was largely due the advent of diesel and electric engines; 
as testimony to their longevity, some 2-10-0s remained in service in Greece until the 
1980s.
93
  In his history of the Austerity engines, Rowledge writes that these ‘stopgap’ 




[Fig. 3 here Image of restored 2-10-0 (not attached).] 
No such testimony exists for the ASG. Inadequately resourced, incompetently 
modified from a successful design, and with insufficient safety restrictions placed 
upon its use, the engine has had few advocates. It is known only for its notorious 
history of causing a major strike in Western Australia, with severe economic, 
industrial and political ramifications, as well as accidents, derailments and one 
fatality. The only surviving ASG is a Victorian-manufactured and operated engine 
preserved at the Williamstown Railway Museum in Melbourne.
95
  It is a sad fate for 
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the flawed giant of WAGR’s steam era.  Historian and former rail engineer Richard 
Hartley observed that the ASG played an essential role in ‘keeping the Allies’ war 
effort on the rails … for a vital six months’.  Yet, he concluded, ‘those achievements 
are now almost forgotten and the ASG is recalled with bitter memories of industrial 
disruption and struggles for safe working conditions’.
96
  The WALEDF&CU won a 
belated victory after a bitter struggle but, with dieselization just around the corner – 
the first Y and X class diesels arrived in 1953 and 1954 respectively –  there would 
soon be other challenges for the Union, as the era of steam disappeared and with it 
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